The replication crisis in psychology has been a fascinating lens into the methodology of many well known professionals. See this bit from Conversations with Tyler where Cowen is talking with noted psychologist Daniel Kahneman:

COWEN: Now  your basic distinction between System 1 and System 2, thinking fast and  thinking slow — to the extent that particular results do not replicate,  do you view that as undercutting the System 1 versus System 2  distinction? Or is that immune to the degree of replicability?

KAHNEMAN: There were whole sets of results that I published in Thinking, Fast and Slow that I wish I hadn’t published because they’re not reliable.

Whether it undercuts . . . The idea of two systems is really anchored in a basic sort of fact of experience, that the process by which you get 2 plus 2 is fundamentally different from the way that you get 17 by 24. One of them happens automatically, associatively, quickly. You have no control. The other demands effort and is slow and so on. That’s immune to replication.

COWEN: But if there’s a bias in individuals and noise, why should we trust our experience about this apparent sense of having two methods? Is it three? Is it four?

KAHNEMAN: Well,  in the first place, those are extremes. It doesn’t mean that there aren’t others. It doesn’t mean that there is not a continuum. But there is at least a continuum to be explored of those two extremes. Of that I’m quite confident.

I apologize for the lengthy quotation but the comment should be rendered in the entirety of its context to understand it properly. Let me provide you an alternate, less polite transcript-ish reading:

COWEN: You published conclusions based on evidence we now would know better than to be persuaded by. Why should we still trust you, and why do you stand by conclusions based on a false justification?

KAHNEMAN: My model is so vague that it can never be proven or disproven. All I really said was that humans do things with different level of deliberateness.

This ought to be an extremely distressing thing to hear, as the head of the Psychology department at Princeton, where he teaches. If they wanted someone to lecture about "anchored in a basic sort of fact of experience" that is "immune" (read: will fail) to replication, I don't know what to tell you – maybe visit the literature department? You've invited a living TED talk into your academy. Pray the faith healers do not swiftly follow.

The bananas part is, we understand the level of deliberation it takes to get things right. The replication crisis is only a crisis and not a nightmare because limited and largely intuitive results were also included in the cohort of studies they wanted to check. If you had the list of experiments, and knew the number that replicated, you could guess correctly which ones failed to. It is instructive to seek out the list and attempt to – if I remember correctly, the list is a bit hard to find and the up/down on replication isn't put simply into a chart, so it might take a bit. But the results which seem likely or specific or limited – good work done by diligent people, for the most part – those didn't have the problems that Kahneman's work had.

But the fact that you could do this replication prediction (and trust me, you could) says both that (1) your intuition is better than the modern psychology academic system, and (2) there isn't really a problem with psychology per se. There's a problem with how psychology relates to itself and the wider community. Have interesting results. Give TED talks. Get in the news. Be counter-intuitive. Be general instead of specific. That's what gets rewarded. It's completely toxic, and driving out the people who want (larger grants for) larger, more powerful, specific experiments studying questions that won't necessarily lead to international aplomb.